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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

Pac. Coast Fed'n of Fisherman's Ass'ns v. United States Bureau of
Reclamation, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (holding the
Bureau of Reclamation failed to follow the procedural guidelines of
the Endangered Species Act when it implemented its 2000 operations
plan for the Klamath Project, and enjoining the Bureau from
continuing with that plan until it complied with such guidelines).
The Klamath Project ("Project") is actually a series of water
diversion projects, including a number of dams, located in Oregon
and California within the Upper Klamath and Lost River Basins. The
Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau") manages water usage, including
flow rates, throughout the Project. The Iron Gate Dam in California is
the furthest downstream dam in the Project. The stretch of the
Klamath River below Iron Gate Dam is a critical habitat for Coho
salmon, a species listed as "threatened" under the Endangered Species
Act ("ESA").
Under the terms of the ESA, the Bureau must prepare a biological
assessment if it learns a threatened species is present in an area where
it proposes an action. The purpose of this assessment is to determine
the effect of the proposed action on the threatened species. Should
the Bureau find the threatened species would not be affected, the
Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary") must concur with this finding.
Should the Bureau find the proposed action would affect the
threatened species, it must request formal consultation from the
Secretary, who must then prepare a biological opinion, stating
whether, in its opinion, the proposed action is likely to jeopardize the
threatened species. With respect to Coho salmon, the Secretary's
authority has been delegated to the National Marine Fisheries Service
("NMFS-).
On April 26, 2000, the Bureau implemented its operations plan for
the Project for the year 2000. Although it was engaged in discussions
with the NMFS, the Pacific Coast Federation of Fisherman's
Associations ("Pacific Coast") filed a motion for relief based on the
Bureau's alleged violations of the ESA. Pacific Coast charged the
Bureau had not followed the above procedure in implementing its
operations plan, and, thus, had taken irrevocable action resulting in
Pacific Coast, the Bureau, and an
harm to Coho salmon.
interpleading party then each filed a motion for summary judgment.
The court granted Pacific Coast's motion, and granted in part and
denied in part the (nearly identical) motions of the Bureau and the
interpleader. As such, the court enjoined the Bureau from sending
certain deliveries of irrigation water down the Klamath.
No material facts were disputed in the case. The Bureau knew the
Coho salmon was a threatened species, and it knew its regulation of
flow rates from the Iron Gate Dam would affect those species.
Therefore, under the ESA, it was required to request formal
consultation from the NMFS on any plan that affected those flow rates.
Yet, the Bureau never prepared a biological assessment, let alone
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requested formal consultation. Although it was engaged in discussions
with the NMFS on April 26, 2000, these discussions were about the
future flow rates on the Klamath River in general; they did not afford
the NMFS the opportunity to approve or evaluate the operations plan
for the year 2000. The court held these actions were clearly in
violation of the ESA, and granted Pacific Coast's motion for summary
judgment. The judge granted the Bureau's and the interpleader's
motions as to Pacific Coast's second charge maintaining the Bureau
had taken irrevocable action before completing the formal
consultation. The court held the issue not yet reviewable since the
formal consultation had not begun.
In light of these judgments, the court enjoined the Bureau from
making water deliveries when the flow rates below Iron Gate Dam were
below scientific estimates of levels needed for restoration and
maintenance of Coho salmon habitats on the Kalmath River.
James Siegesmund
Caprio v. Upjohn Co., 148 F. Supp. 2d 168 (D. Conn. 2001) (holding
under the Connecticut Clean Water Act ("CCWA"), which states that
"pollution of the waters of the state is inimical to the public health,
safety and welfare of the inhabitants of the state" and that "no persons
or municipality shall cause pollution of any of the waters of the state or
maintain a discharge of any treated or untreated wastes," residents who
have suffered injury due to pollution or hazardous waste discharged
into the waters of Connecticut may bring a negligence per se action
against the polluters).
The plaintiff ("Caprio") brought this action against the Upjohn
Company ("Upjohn") claiming that Upjohn had exposed him to
hazardous chemical substances contained in toxic sludge, which led to
his developing bladder cancer. Upjohn filed a motion to dismiss
Caprio's second cause of action, which alleged that Upjohn violated
the Connecticut Clean Water Act ("CCWA").
Upjohn's manufacturing of chemicals generated industrial toxic
waste in the form of sludge. Upjohn transported the toxic sludge by
truck and railroad car to open ponds to release the waste into the
environment. Caprio alleged in his second cause of action that he
suffered injury as a result of Upjohn releasing these hazardous
chemical substances.
Caprio further alleged that Upjohn was
negligent, in that releasing the harmful sludge caused the cancer.
Upjohn filed a motion to dismiss the second and third counts for
failing to state a claim and further argued that the statute of
limitations had run on Caprio's negligence claim. The trial court
dismissed the second count based on the fact that the Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation Liability Act ("CERCLA")

